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REVIEWS.

The Logical Process of Social Development. A Theoretical Foundation for Educational Policy from the Standpoint of Sociology. By JOHN FRANKLIN CROWELL. Henry Holt & Co. Pp. ix+358.

THE author aims to solve a double problem, viz.: "First, to determine in a theoretical outline the nature and logical method of the social process; second, on the foundation of these results to determine the normal educational policy for the community" (Preface, p. vi). The present volume is devoted to the first part of this task, viz., "that of arriving at such an interpretation of the logical process of social development as will serve for a conceptual outline of social policy in which education may take its normal part in national progress." A second volume is promised, applying the results presented in this book to actual conditions. The author's presentation of "the sociological basis" is in the following form:

BOOK I. THE SOCIETARY PROCESS.

- Chap. I. Introduction: Sociological Theory.
- Chap. II. The Developmental Process: A Typological Series.
- Chap. III. Social Types.
- Chap. IV. Sociological Types.

BOOK II. THE SOCIOLOGICAL POSTULATES.

- Chap. V. The Social Situation: Typal Integration.
- Chap. VI. The Social Interests: Typal Differentiation.
- Chap. VII. The Social System: Typal Assimilation.
- Chap. VIII. The Social Mind: Typal Solidarity.

BOOK III. THE SOCIOLOGICAL AXIOMS.

- Chap. IX. Typicality: Sociality and Symbolism.
- Chap. X. Normality: Conventionality and Property.
- Chap. XI. Institutionalality: Order and Progress.
- Chap. XII. Ideality: Religion and Science.

BOOK IV. THE SOCIOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.

- Chap. XIII. The Axiomatic Aspects of Selective Survival.
- Chap. XIV. The Selective Survival of Sociological Types.
- Chap. XV. Progress. Its Nature, Methods, and Aims.
- Chap. XVI. The Theoretical Method of Types.

Dr. Crowell's work deserves very much more attention than it is likely to get. His powers of analysis and abstraction are evidently of high order, but nothing less than overpowering sense of professional duty will induce anybody to attempt playing the Bowditch to his Laplace to the extent of puzzling out the meaning to the end. This is unfortunate, for the author uses some of the most timely conceptions in sociological theory, and there is hidden away in the excessively obscure form of the book some extremely useful discrimination.

To begin with the least essential fault, it is to be regretted that the author has not been more precise, or at least more perspicuous, in the use of terms. He uses many familiar words in more than one sense, and just when it is necessary to be sure of their exact force they apparently mean something to the author which they do not suggest to the reader; or they stand for one of several concepts, and the reader cannot tell which of them to select. If I am not mistaken, this is true of the very important term "type." It sometimes means a real correlation of persons. Again it means a subjective construction of represented persons into conceptual relations. Still again it means a potential, but unimagined, arrangement of persons. Possibly it has other shades of meaning. At all events, I fail to see how either of above senses fits in certain cases.

The same might be illustrated in the case of the term "social." It is so liberally used that I find myself unable to associate distinct notions with it in a particular case. For example, on p. 14, the word is used as substantive or adjective eight times, and I find it impossible to frame a theory that will give to the term the same force in each instance. In connection with the first line of p. 19, the query arises, "Would the phrase 'social man' mean the same thing if the attributive were omitted?" If not, where have we a specimen of "man" not "social," and are there enough of him to form a class which we must exclude from sociological consideration? The next sentence seems to imply that "social man" and "man" are interchangeable terms for the *genus* that sociology studies. This conclusion is reinforced by the assertion (p. 49):

Sociology has nothing to do with any human being except as he is or has been a member of a collective kind, and being or having been such, it has everything to do with him that in any way gives him a social value.

Not least among the difficulties of the reader, therefore, is his perplexity about when to interpret the term "social" as adding something to a proposition, and when to treat it as dead wood. What precise

content the term has when it is a meaning factor, is a question that few readers will be able to answer.

Trouble of similar sort is found with the terms "sociology" and "sociological." They have been used so liberally that clearness has been sacrificed. For instance, on p. iv, the author proposes his general question in the words: ". . . . By what *sociological* methods must we proceed, etc.?" But on p. 58 he begins to discuss "*sociological* types," and describes a *sociological* type as one of four species of "types of personality," or of "social organization." Evidently the term "sociological" has distinct intention and extension for the two uses. "Sociological" apparently means something like "progressive" in some cases; in others, "superior" (*vide* pp. 58, 62, 84, etc.).

Again, the terms "social" and "sociological" are made antithetical in some parts of the discussion (*vide* table of contents and p. 16), while they appear to have no antithetical force in other passages. This still further confuses concepts. Besides this, the terms "social" and "sociological" are sometimes used as formal and sometimes as qualitative categories. Uncertainty about the content of propositions is inevitable, and the reader's patience is correspondingly overtaxed. If the thought is precise, justice both to author and reader demands more precise expression.

There is, also, a lack of traceable coherence between propositions, in the earlier chapters particularly; and this makes it impossible, in many cases, to decide just what idea the author intends to convey. An occasional illustration would have enabled the reader to settle upon that one of alternative interpretations of abstract statements which was in the writer's mind. In the absence of such clues the meaning is doubtful. A paragraph, and then a chapter, and then another, made up of these vague and unintegrated propositions presents a problem too intricate for solution.

Perhaps the most obvious case of inexact and inconsistent use of terms is the following. The first sentence of the preface declares:

The social process in its logical character is here regarded as the process of the selective survival of *types of personality*.

The first sentence of chap. I reads:

This book is a theoretical attempt to introduce orderly arrangement into the study of the phenomena of social life by the rigid application of a single logical hypothesis—the selective survival of *sociological types*.

As a matter of course, we assume, then, that "types of personality"

and "sociological types" are equivalent and interchangeable. On any other hypothesis the propositions quoted would be at variance with each other. They would be of different degrees of exactness, though not necessarily irreconcilable. It is most natural to understand them as identical. Attempting to get exact conceptions from these terms upon this assumption, we read on until, at p. 58, the author deliberately tells us that :

A *sociological type* is either a potentially normal type of personality or a theoretically superior type of social organization. . . . It is one of four terms in the typological series.

That is, "sociological type," instead of being equivalent to "type of personality," stands for a species, while the supposed equivalent stands for the genus containing the species. No wonder that our attempt to get precise notions from the author's language has given us the impression of a wild-goose chase. After we have detected this variability of terms in a few instances, the temptation is strong to charge all further vagueness to similar shiftings of verbal usage which have escaped detection.

But the faults of style are of less importance than the faults of method. The former are individual. The latter are common to a considerable number of sociologists. Some of them, too, are making important contributions to sociology, in spite of the faulty method. I believe the present author is entitled to some of this credit, in spite of the vagaries to be noted.

For illustration of the tendency which the author exemplifies I select the following (pp. 59-60) :

By whatever name it be known, this *constructive anticipation of the normally potential type*¹ is real to both logic and to life which science observes ; . . . because the process of scientific thinking is none other than this process — the application of past experience to the new conditions that arise by the projection of the observed order of events into the future. The social spirit speculates on what had better be done next. The social process answers this question by giving, in the sociological type, the next term potentially normal enough to meet the anticipated requisites of survival. Development arises from this very act of realization.

Thus the author confidently and dogmatically propounds a theory in serene disregard of the most obvious facts which confront anyone who approaches social changes from the other point of view, viz., first, observation and grouping of phenomena ; second, inquiry as to what

¹ The italics in this case are the author's.

influences appear in the group or series of facts under observation. The generalization would be upset instantly by the course of English history, for example. Everybody knows that, so far as conscious and avowed aims are concerned, the look of English leaders from time immemorial has been, *in form*, backward, not forward. They have demanded "the ancient rights of Englishmen," not "the normally potential type." What wonder that "sociology" is ridiculous, not merely in the eyes of business men, but to historians and other nearly related investigators, when sociologists persist in forcing fanciful interpretations upon facts which have been more truly explained by less pretentious students?

The mistake in all this is, first, in crediting men in the past with a kind and degree of reflection upon social changes that they never bestowed; and, second, in assuming that a factor (*e. g.*, "speculative sense of the socially superior as a realizable social end," p. 60), which may, by a stretch of imagination, be traced in some past changes, is the significant and dominant influence in all changes. The credulity necessary for either assumption would be capable of taking *Alice in Wonderland* literally. Not one person in a thousand in the United States today knows what a "social type" means. Possibly one hundred in a thousand would be able to entertain the notion if it were sufficiently explained. Possibly ten out of the hundred more abstract thinkers might be capable of aiming their action toward an abstractly conceived social type. That this mental process is now or ever has been the typical, regular, usual determining influence in changing the forms of society is a supposition so extravagant that no student of history would feel safe in predicating it in full force of any single social change on a large scale. If there is a better *prima facie* case than the doctrinaire factor in the French Revolution, it does not occur to me, and I should like to see Dr. Crowell pick his way through even the more familiar records of that period, and bring his theory out intact.

When the author asserts (p. 63) that "no parliamentary discussion ever takes place without taking into account the effect of any measure on the type that normally tends to prevail," he is as near and as far from the truth as though he should say: "No fire department ever answers an alarm without taking into account the chemical relations of oxygen to the properties of other substances." The things taken account of in either instance may be translated by philosophers into terms of the relations alleged; but to assert that they are in that form in the minds of the actors, or that the efficient motives in the minds of the actors are considerations of that order of generality, is arrant nonsense. Con-

gressmen voted for or against forcible dealings with Spain because they wanted to avenge the "Maine," or to stop cruelty, or to remove obstacles to trade, or to secure their own reelection. Their votes will affect future types of correlation in the United States, in Cuba, in Spain, and perhaps in the rest of the world; but that consideration of social types as types ever entered the thoughts of 5 per cent. of them is too absurd for second mention by anybody but a speculative sociologist. How can we expect to win the respect of sane men for sociology if we persist in making it a farrago of conceits that vaporize at the first contact with reality?

The method is still more radically at fault in selecting for examination purely conjectural conditions, as though they were real reactions encountered in the course of observation. The first step is, therefore, to beg the question of fact. Thus (p. 65):

The problem then is to find, for the right grasp of the societary processes, a guiding standard or progressive point of view going before and giving precision of aim to the tendential forces, so that these various type-developing tendencies may find the forces to which they are capable of converging, etc.

Everything that the author has said up to this point makes it necessary to understand the above as though he had said expressly that the desired standard is *consciously* in the minds of effective members of society. It is, however, a plain begging of the question to proceed upon the assumption that there is any such conscious standard. The hypothesis of a "tendency-controlling criterion" is perfectly legitimate, if used as a pointer in the collection of evidence. It is entirely illegitimate when taken as an established position from which argument may proceed. Nobody has proved that such a conscious criterion exists. On the contrary, everybody who has given much attention to the facts, including the present author when in a realistic temper, doubts the wide prevalence of such a state of consciousness. A bigger book than the volume in hand could be filled with evidence against the hypothesis easier than the author could convince a jury of historians that any single case of social modification may be accounted for by the assumption. It is pure illusion to suppose, therefore, that a principle so utterly supposititious can be made a scientific basis for pedagogy or anything else. It has no feet for its own support.

It is difficult to understand how a writer so intelligent as the present author can have come to maturity in this half of the nineteenth century with so little respect for the requirements of exact science. It would seem as though he would find it occasionally necessary to drop

down into the concrete long enough to find a point or two of correspondence between his generalizations and reality. It would seem likely *a priori* that he would try to discover in the course of human experience at least one specific "sociological type" for example, the use of which he might demonstrate in a single instance. If the architect of human fortunes has always been the "sociological type," it would seem as though a solitary instance at least might be specified. To inductive thinkers the name and address of a thousand such would have to be assured in order to give the hypothesis credit. The method of the author is not inductive, however, and it apparently does not acknowledge the necessity of evidence. There are hints at supposed cases in point (*vide* pp. 74, 109, 111, 154, etc.), but these are merely dogmatic illustrations, not cases critically examined in test of the thesis. Accordingly the book is full of generalizations that are true of nothing in particular.

This disregard of the canons of inductive science does injustice to the elements of truth which might be discovered by critical use of the author's postulate. "Selective transition" (p. 84) is not a factor utterly unknown in social changes. It is not present in these changes in the form and force which the author presumes. Accordingly such a writer as von Jhering has detected much more than the present author about the facts of individual contribution to social changes. Even in case of conscious societary action, the thing willed is only rarely change of type—as when a state adopts a new constitution—and in those rare instances the change is thought of as a change of type by a rare few only. The conscious end in most cases is a specific good of situation or possession. This good, when realized, may be a factor making for change of type, but this latter fact does not help the author's thesis.

Several traits of Dr. Crowell's style are exemplified in the following sentence (p. 100; *cf.* pp. 117, 154, etc.):

Personality has become what *he* is by conformity to traditional type: this factor, plus *his* impelling desires, are the two forms indicating to us what *he* tends to become.

I do not understand these liberties with the personal pronouns. To my mind no end justifies the means. The solecisms throw no light on the thought. There is a still more radical fault involved, viz., that of dealing with the abstraction, *personality*, when we ought to be studying the concrete qualities of *persons*. It crops out again in this form (p. 128):

The traditional and the adoptive types of personality . . . become more

and more complementary . . . as the societary *process* becomes more fully aware of the potential aims comprising the social policy.

Again (p. 140):

The consciousness, among the ruling *tendencies*, of active or latent qualities or conditions incompatible with the potential type . . . is the characteristic antinomy of this aspect of social evolution.

Again, on p. 163, "personality" and "the social tendencies" are referred to in company with, and apparently in distinction from, "the community," as being guided by synthetic *judgments* in the selection of the means of social realization, and (p. 241) we read: "Social selection may be defined as the preference of the *social process* for the type that normally tends to prevail."¹

All this personification of an abstraction is more than a figure of speech. It may lead the persons who practice the corresponding habit of thought to ignore concrete realities and to put in their place arbitrary mental constructions. The present author has succumbed to this temptation. I might accordingly state my case against the whole method illustrated by this book by charging that it tends to substitute conventional, arbitrary, unreal concepts, as subject-matter and material for conclusion, for the real concepts that must be the subject-matter of objective science. The method is then not objective science. It is the systematization of fictions. For instance, "the type of person recognized as entitled to control in the family, the class, the community, and the nation" (p. 103). This is a philosopher's conceit. It plays absolutely no rôle in the real world. No flesh-and-blood man ever wrestles with such a concept in the business of life. We deal with individuals and concrete things and conditions. We must "keep off the grass," if the city ordinance says so; we must "move on" in the crowded street, if the policeman has orders to make us; we must pay an income tax, if it gets to be the law of the land; but it is the rare specialist only who ever thinks to generalize these incidents of life, or who discerns in them any relation to "types" of any sort. The illusion to which such writers as the present author yield is that the real world has conducted its affairs after philosophers' fashion. It is the illusion that men have had in mind, before action, the same estimate of their acts which philosophers pass after the event! It seems hardly possible that any man in his right mind could deliberately maintain that this is the case. Yet Dr. Crowell's main thesis amounts to this. Unless he holds to it in this

¹ Cf. use of terms "social spirit" and "social process" in quotation above from p. 59.

sense, his "logical process of social development" ceases entirely to be an attempt at genetic explanation.¹ It does not offer a clue to the actual motivation of social development. It simply shows how the course of human actions might have been recommended to the reflective in advance, if anybody had been able to see future events in the same light in which they present themselves to Dr. Crowell now that they are past.

Perhaps the thoroughly artificial character of the whole discussion is still more evident in connection with the following passage (p. 155):

The four *typal* principles are: *typal integration*, *typal differentiation*, *typal assimilation*, and *typal solidarity*. . . . These principles are, therefore, the *causal relations* which sociology, like every other body of knowledge, finds it necessary to formulate.

That is, the author is not content to treat the most abstract general concepts as concrete realities. He posits them as efficient causes! Scientific examination of facts cannot, of course, come within the scope of such a method. It reduces to dialectics pure and simple. Its naïve assumption is that the categories which the mind must use in order to think the actual over again must be the factors which produced these realities (*cf.* pp. 172-3).

It may seem strange that so much space is given to a book that must be so seriously arraigned. The explanation is that the subject is important; it has received comparatively little treatment; and in spite of all that has been said, the author has made a certain contribution to the machinery of sociological investigation. If he had undertaken much less, his contribution might have been clear and available. His constant straining after expression of universalities impresses the reader as a symptom of incomplete acquaintance both with life and with science. Intimate knowledge of the relations generalized would keep most scholars from multiplying propositions that purport to epitomize all human experience. Dr. Crowell has floundered through a quicksand of speculation which he might have avoided by sharply distinguishing between a genetic explanation of society and the concepts which we find it useful to employ when we set in order and try to explain what we have learned about society. The book is the mouthpiece of "two voices," the one trying to formulate the law of societal evolution, the other explaining "the logical processes especially appropriate for the investigation of social phenomena" (p. 5).

¹ This applies with equal force to the substance of Book III, *The Sociological Axioms*.

Most of the time the author vainly attempts to tell the two stories at once, with the result that he expresses neither correctly. If he would shake off the incubus of his genetic hypothesis, and give us separately his account of the categories necessary in critical study of social relations, the service would be considerable. He has done very nearly this in the final chapter, "The Theoretical Method of Types." It is the most straightforward analysis in the whole book. It is a pity that the entire discussion is not equally lucid.

ALBION W. SMALL.

American Contributions to Civilization, and Other Essays and Addresses. By CHARLES WILLIAM ELIOT, LL.D., President of Harvard University. New York: The Century Co.

SUCH force, ripeness, strength, and sanity as America has developed must be sought in the thinking of the class to which President Eliot belongs. He is the busy man of leisure, the practical theorist, the cosmopolitan frontiersman, the cultured man of affairs of our American élite. The type is too little known abroad, and more rare than we could wish at home. Yet, where there is one American who writes on the plane which President Eliot occupies, a thousand think or at least feel there, and his book will help them frame their thought. His chapters are entitled: "Five American Contributions to Civilization;" "Some Reasons why the American Republic May Endure;" "The Working of the American Democracy;" "The Forgotten Millions;" "Family Stocks in a Democracy;" "Equality in a Republic;" "One Remedy for Municipal Misgovernment;" "Wherein Popular Education has Failed;" "Three Results of the Scientific Study of Nature;" "The Happy Life;" "A Republican Gentleman;" "Present Disadvantages of Rich Men;" "The Exemption from Taxation;" "The Future of the New England Churches;" "Why We Honor the Puritans;" "Heroes of the Civil War;" "International Arbitration;" "Inscriptions."

A. W. S.

Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy. By E. L. GODKIN. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1898. Pp. vii + 265.

"I HAVE endeavored in the following pages, not to describe democracy—something which has been done by abler hands than mine—but to describe some of the departures it has made from the ways which its earlier promoters expected it to follow. It has done a great